Bharat Through the Prism of Operation Sindoor: Confronting Global Threats and Shaping New Opportunities

Bharat Through the Prism of Operation Sindoor: Confronting Global Threats and Shaping New Opportunities

Abstract:  In response to the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, Bharat carried out decisive airstrikes on the night of 6-7 May 2025, targeting locations in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and deep inside Pakistan. Operation Sindoor was not merely a military action; it marked a shift in Bharat’s approach towards terrorism and national security. The operation reflected a new sense of confidence, decisiveness, and strategic self-reliance.

In today’s volatile global order, where proxy wars are widespread and economic coercion is increasingly being utilised as a weapon. Bharat is progressing with a policy based on strategic autonomy and self-reliance (Aatmanirbharta) while focusing on safeguarding its borders and national interests as well.

Operation Sindoor symbolises Bharat’s transition from a reactive posture to a proactive and assertive counter-terrorism strategy, which is now referred to as the country’s “new normal”.

This article examines the evolving contours of Bharat’s national security policy and global diplomacy in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor. It also explores the potential path ahead, offering recommendations on domestic and foreign policy imperatives India must address.

Keywords: Pahalgam terrorist attack, Operation Sindoor, Bharat-Pakistan tensions, Bharat-China relations, new global order, geopolitical strategy, counter-terrorism policy, balance of power.

Strategic Cooperation Between Pakistan and China Against Bharat: An Emerging Two-Front Plus Military Threat

The geopolitical and military cooperation between China and Pakistan began in the 1960s, with a significant turning point marked by the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Following that, in 1963, Pakistan signed a border agreement with China, ceding 5,180 square kilometres of Bhartiya territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) to China. This agreement laid the foundation for deeper strategic alignment between the two countries. Today, Bharat’s decades-long border disputes with both China and Pakistan, compounded by their nuclear capabilities, highlight the structural reality of what has come to be known as the “two-front plus” challenge.

The China-Pakistan strategic partnership, driven by a shared rivalry with Bharat, has acquired a new geostrategic dimension since August 2019. Recent developments, such as Bharat’s “Operation Sindoor” and Pakistan’s subsequent military response, illustrate the depth and quality of this bilateral engagement. This partnership is maturing rapidly and could prove decisive shortly. In the case of the Bharatiya economy, the options to manoeuvre out of this strategic entanglement are becoming increasingly limited.

According to the Mandala theory of the renowned Indian strategic thinker Kautilya, China and Pakistan have emerged as natural strategic partners working to balance Bharat’s regional influence. This partnership was vividly demonstrated during “Operation Sindoor”, when the Bhartiya Army conducted military strikes on terror camps in response to a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir, on May 6-7, 2025. In retaliation, Pakistan launched “Operation Bunyān-ul-Marsūs”. The use of Chinese-made fighter jets, PL-15 missiles, and drones during this operation exposed a deep level of operational coordination between the two militaries.

Simultaneously, the presence of China’s advanced research vessel Da Yang Yi Hao in the Indian Ocean, equipped with sophisticated sensors, indicated broader strategic alignment. Beyond just military hardware, Pakistan has also benefited from China’s air defence systems and its satellite-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. Briefings from Pakistan’s DG ISPR also suggest that Pakistan is attempting to adopt the Chinese military’s “multi-domain warfare strategy”.

This entire standoff underscores the reality of an evolving China-Pakistan “two-front plus military threat”. What began as geopolitical alignment has now transformed into a coordinated and effective military synergy, which poses a serious challenge to Bharat’s national security.

In recent years, the strategic partnership between China and Pakistan has been further reinforced by multiple geopolitical developments: Bharat’s surgical strike in September 2016, the Balakot airstrike in February 2019, the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, the Galwan Valley standoff in May 2020, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, and the intensifying power rivalry between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific region. Against this backdrop, China- and to a certain extent Pakistan—seeks to redefine its role and presence in the regional order.

Historically, both China and Pakistan have aimed to deprive India of its legitimate claims over the region of Jammu and Kashmir. When the Bhartiya government abrogated Article 370 in August 2019, thereby revoking Jammu & Kashmir’s special status and reorganizing it into two Union Territories- Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh- both countries strongly opposed the move.

From a geopolitical perspective, this reorganization reaffirmed Bharat’s legitimate claims over areas currently under illegal occupation by Pakistan and China- namely, Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Aksai Chin, and the Shaksgam Valley. For Pakistan, the United States has now been replaced by China as its primary strategic partner. The volume and sophistication of military cooperation between China and Pakistan have significantly increased, which has reduced Pakistan’s reliance on Washington. However, the fact that U.S. leanings during Operation Sindoor appeared more favourable to Pakistan presents a complex challenge for Bharat.

Due to their structural alignment, the China-Pakistan strategic cooperation can be described as a “threshold alliance”, a partnership that falls short of a formal treaty but imposes no upper limit on cooperation. This setup facilitates the sharing, coordination, and consolidation of military capabilities against Bharat.

China-Pakistan military collaboration is no longer confined to Cold War-era symbolism. It now poses a tangible and immediate threat to Bharat. China not only equips Pakistan with military tools but also instills confidence to challenge Bharat’s military power. While debates continue over the effectiveness of Chinese military technologies, the events surrounding Operation Sindoor serve as a serious wake-up call for Bharat. The threat becomes even more acute given the increasing joint coordination, synergy, and operational compatibility between the two countries’ armed forces.

Bharat must closely monitor the evolving and maturing dimensions of China-Pakistan military cooperation. Simultaneously, the Bhartiya military should enhance its understanding of Chinese military doctrines and capabilities in collaboration with strategic partners like the United States. Structured training programs, joint planning initiatives, and enhanced interoperability efforts could help develop a more focused and comprehensive strategic understanding.

Ultimately, Bharat must work toward building a more integrated capability system and devising effective strategic alternatives to counter potential threats. Only through such comprehensive preparedness can New Delhi strengthen its strategic posture and safeguard national security.

 

Threshold Alliance of China-Pakistan against Bharat’s Strategic Capabilities

The China-Pakistan relationship has evolved over the decades into a full-fledged and comprehensive strategic partnership. China’s role in strengthening Pakistan’s military capabilities has significantly heightened the strategic challenge for Bharat. The sequence of events encompassing Operation Sindoor and Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos has activated the China-Bharat-Pakistan triangular rivalry in real-time.

In this context, the way Bharat and Pakistan integrated and employed their military capabilities during the 7-10 May 2025 crisis not only redefined the utility of military power but also set a crucial benchmark for understanding the future trajectory of this triangular dynamic. For the first time, the conflict transcended the boundaries of conventional warfare, evolving into a more provocative, stand-off style of engagement. This marks a clear departure from the traditional Bharat-Pakistan war model, now increasingly reliant on technology-based capabilities.

The China-Pakistan joint military exercises-focusing on shared training, hardware interoperability, procedures, and joint planning, have laid the groundwork for wartime coordination. Platforms like the JF-17 and J-10C fighter jets, PL-15E BVR missiles, FM-90, LY-80 (HQ-16A), and HQ-9/P air defence systems, along with Chinese-made drones, were used by Pakistan against Bharat (Tripathi and Bommakanti 2025).

On 7 May 2025, Pakistan created a serious operational challenge for Bharat through its ‘kill-chain’ process, which integrated sensor data from ground and space with frontline fighter aircraft. The use of the electromagnetic battlespace, enhanced by Chinese technological and training support, emerged as a new and potent strategic reality. In this context, Pakistan claimed to have shot down several Bhartiya fighter jets. Additionally, China’s BeiDou satellite system played a vital role in real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (Pradhan 2025).

Bharat on the other hand, carried out stand-off airstrikes using BrahMos and French-origin SCALP-EG cruise missiles, as well as HAMMER glide bombs (Patil and Rawat 2025). Bharat’s integrated air and missile defence system prevented Pakistan from mounting any decisive counteraction between 8 and 10 May. This layered system included S-400 (long range), Barak-8 (medium range), Akash and SPYDER (short range), and Igla-M, Igla-S, and L-70 (very short range) systems (Tripathi and Bommakanti 2025). The setup was further reinforced by the Air Force’s IACCS and the Army’s Akashteer command system. This ‘whole-of-operations’ approach demonstrated seamless coordination and synergy among the three branches of Bharat’s armed forces.

The Bhartiya military also executed deep-penetration SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) missions, destroying multiple high-value targets deep inside Pakistan, thereby setting a new precedent for operational victory. This compelled the Pakistani side to seek a ceasefire.

In the age of technology-especially in a nuclear backdrop, wars are likely to be short, intense, and focused on decisive outcomes. The episode underscores those conventional notions of warfare based on sheer numbers and brute force are no longer decisive. Instead, qualitative metrics-like technological superiority, doctrine-based operations, and strategic orientation, will shape the future of modern warfare.

The events of Operation Sindoor offer critical lessons that help define the broader contours of Bharat’s defence strategy in this new era.

Operation Sindoor and the Evolution of Bharat’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy

On May 10, 2025, Director General of Military Operations (DGMO)-level talks between Bharat and Pakistan brought a pause to Operation Sindoor. The operation had begun on the morning of May 7, 2025, as a precise and measured military response by Bharat to the Pahalgam terror attack. Under this operation, Bharat targeted nine terrorist camps located inside Pakistan. After achieving its political objective, Bharat also offered Pakistan an off-ramp, a chance to de-escalate tensions.

However, Pakistan, constrained by internal political pressures and the need to maintain its national prestige, refused the offer. As a result, both sides were drawn into several rounds of missile and drone strikes, retaliatory actions, and intense shelling along the Line of Control (LoC). In the course of this conflict, Bharat’s air defence systems proved highly effective, while Pakistan’s systems largely failed, playing a decisive role in the outcome. Eventually, the aerial confrontations ceased on May 10.

Now that hostilities have subsided, it is essential to assess the long-term implications of this episode for the future strategic dynamics between Bharat and Pakistan. The episode not only redefined the military balance but also highlighted Bharat’s political will, technological edge, and crisis management capabilities.

Bharat’s aerial strikes on Pakistani military assets, the subsequent declaration of new counter-terrorism red lines in the media, and their reaffirmation by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his address-all these developments point toward a significant shift in Bharat’s strategic posture. This new strategy carries a limited but clear objective to prevent the damage caused by Pakistan’s traditional policy of sponsoring terrorism.

This objective is primarily, though not entirely, grounded in the doctrine of “deterrence by punishment”. Through this approach, Bharat seeks to send an unequivocal message that if Pakistan initiates any provocative act, Bharat will respond with conventional military force capable of inflicting unbearable damage.

Deterrence by Punishment

Establishing deterrence against an ideologically motivated, revisionist, and resolute adversary is an immense challenge. The success of deterrence depends less on what the deterrer does and more on the psychological impact it has on the adversary- how it reshapes their cost-benefit calculations.

For deterrence to be effective any given threat must appear balanced and credible so that the adversary takes it seriously. In a punishment-based strategy, the deterring state must demonstrate both its capability to retaliate and its willingness to accept risks and absorb potential losses if necessary. This combination—capability, resolve, and credible signalling- is what makes deterrence work.

Bharat’s prospects for a punishment-based strategy depend on how effectively it can demonstrate its ability to impose costs on its adversary. Operation Sindoor and the subsequent military standoff have offered important indicators of Bharat’s comparative advantage. Bharat successfully targeted terrorist bases from a distance; its layered air defence system intercepted several waves of drones and missiles; in the post-conflict phase, the Bhartiya Air Force downgraded Pakistan’s air defence network; and finally, Bharat’s missile strikes on Pakistani airbases proved its superiority. However, Bharat’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, did confirm the loss of a few fighter jets on the first day (Bloomberg, 31 May 2025). Nevertheless, this air campaign-backed by Bharat’s naval supremacy, sent a strong message to Pakistan’s military establishment that Bharat possesses a credible and robust punitive strike capability.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s address on 12 May 2025 strengthened the boundaries of Bharat’s new anti-terrorism doctrine. As James D. Fearon notes, democratic leaders incur “audience costs” when they back down during crises (Fearon 1994). Because voters can punish governments for foreign policy failures during elections, it becomes difficult for democratic leaders to make hollow claims or settle for limited actions. Thus when democratic leaders publicly set a red line, adversaries tend to take it as a credible signal.

During the crisis Bhartiya officials were quoted in the media stating that any future terrorist attack would be treated as an “act of war”. However, Prime Minister Modi, while avoiding a direct restatement of this doctrine in his speech, declared, “We will respond in our way, on our terms”. This flexibility may have preserved some space for future strategic manoeuvring, but past military responses have certainly shaped public expectations. Moreover, this declared policy now limits the choices available to future governments, as similar responses will be expected from them as well.

The Prime Minister’s address on 12 May 2025 laid out Bharat’s three-layered anti-terrorism doctrine:

1. Decisive retaliation against terrorist attacks– Any terrorist attack will be treated as an act of war and responded to firmly and decisively, including stand-off attacks originating from Pakistani territory by state or non-state actors.
2. No tolerance for nuclear blackmail– Any attempt to pressure Bharat through nuclear threats will be categorically rejected.
3. No distinction between terrorists and their sponsors– Those who support, shelter, or finance terrorists will be held equally responsible.

Actions based on these principles have already induced a degree of caution or deterrence among terrorists and their sponsors. At the same time, the threshold for Bharat’s punitive response has been lowered compared to the past. In the future, sharper, more decisive, and higher-intensity responses may be expected, for which the Bharat armed forces will need to be more agile and better equipped with advanced technology and modern platforms, as evidenced in the recent operations.

In contrast to Fearon’s theory, some later research suggests that leaders may not always suffer audience costs if their threats prove hollow. If true, this would raise questions about the credibility of Bharat’s newly declared red lines. However, the sudden end of Operation Sindoor and unverified reports of U.S. mediation led to domestic criticism of the Modi government, indicating that audience costs are indeed real and effective in the Bhartiya domestic political context.

While military retaliation after every terror attack can limit Bharat’s strategic flexibility, leading to a “commitment trap” that reduces policy options and risks reputational and public backlash, the irony is that when Bharat’s leadership shows the political will to assume these risks, it enhances deterrence. It sends a clear signal to adversaries like Pakistan that Bharat is no longer bound by traditional limitations.

The effectiveness of Bharat’s deterrence capability depends on the psychological impact it has on Pakistan’s military leadership and strategic calculations. The ideological foundation of Pakistan’s national identity, along with its military establishment, promotes an aggressive, Bharat-centric strategic posture. This dual structure also raises Pakistan’s tolerance for suffering damage. Ironically, the recent crisis also gave the Pakistani military a chance to escape internal political pressures. Ultimately, when a state uses military power not only for security but also for prestige, the credibility of its deterrence weakens.

Yet there remains a potentially viable path for Bharat’s punishment-based strategy. Since the 2016 Uri attack, Bharat-Pakistan crises have taken on a repetitive pattern: Pakistan-sponsored terrorists attack Bharat, Bharat responds militarily, Pakistan retaliates conventionally in a calibrated manner, and the crisis de-escalates-often with third-party mediation, after which both sides portray it as a victory.

In this long-standing hostility, Pakistan’s fragile economy may tilt this iterative equilibrium in Bharat’s favour. A state perpetually struggling with financial crises and reliant on international bailouts cannot afford prolonged military adventures. Unless Pakistani strategists become utterly irrational, they may gradually recognize the futility of sponsoring terrorism, even if this realization is episodic.

Military force is only one instrument of statecraft. Operation Sindoor should remind Bharat that securing itself from Pakistan cannot rely on military means alone. It must give equal priority to foreign policy, diplomacy, and effective narrative management on global platforms. Only by integrating military action with international legitimacy, coherent storytelling, and strategic communication can Bharat develop a robust and effective security approach.

Bharat’s future success in military deterrence will depend on a strategy driven by the interactive and dialectical logic of conflict (Luttwak, 2001), where adversaries learn from defeat and adapt for future confrontations. Pakistan’s military is no exception to this strategic logic. Therefore, Bhartiya strategists must anticipate potential changes in Pakistan’s military posture and prepare countermeasures that allow Bharat to maintain “escalation dominance”. A key indicator will be Pakistan’s future arms acquisitions, geopolitical alignments- especially the emerging China-Pakistan-Turkey-Azerbaijan nexus- and changes in its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

In a nuclear environment, Bharat must strike a careful balance: calibrated responses, regional stability, credible signalling, risk assessment, and avoidance of commitment traps. Some sections of the strategic community expressed disappointment at the sudden termination of Bharat’s latest military campaign, viewing it as a missed opportunity to degrade Pakistan’s air power. However, this decision underscores the complexity of Bharat’s strategic calculus. Punitive strategies are effective only when they signal that punishment will not be imposed if the adversary respects the status quo. Possibly, Bharat’s limited and precise strikes were aimed at reinforcing its credibility without uncontrolled escalation.

Another key element of this strategic balance is that the challenge of dealing with Pakistan must be viewed in the broader context of Bharat’s economic priorities and the emerging threat from China. Operation Sindoor has revealed that Bharat’s contest is not with Pakistan alone but also increasingly with China. The political transition in Bangladesh in August 2024 signals that a new front may be emerging there as well. Navigating this sensitive geopolitical and security environment will require mature diplomacy and deep strategic insight.

In his 12 May 2025 address to the nation, Prime Minister Modi said that Bharat inflicted such “heavy damage” that Pakistan was compelled to seek international intervention to de-escalate. If that is indeed the case, why did the Bhartiya Prime Minister agree to a ceasefire so quickly? Did he, unintentionally, provide Pakistan with an easy exit?

This decision adds to Bharat’s history of political and diplomatic restraint, erasing military gains. The military campaign under Operation Sindoor was not only strategically calibrated but also undermined Pakistan’s illusion of invincibility under the cover of nuclear weapons. Bharat signalled that proxy wars will no longer be ignored.

However, the Modi government’s decision to pause the operation after just three days could undermine the impact of this bold move. On the international stage, this abrupt end turned a well-executed military operation into an incomplete standoff. In Pakistan where public discontent against the military was rising and people were blaming their generals for the nation’s plight, Bharat’s ‘haste’ may have handed the Pakistani military a psychological and propaganda victory.

Prime Minister Modi has maintained that Bharat has only “paused” the operation, not ended it. But in diplomatic and legal language, that’s essentially a ceasefire. Instead of accepting a U.S.-brokered ceasefire, Bharat could have continued the operation for a few more days, directly challenging Pakistan’s military capacity and credibility. Afterwards, Bharat could have unilaterally declared a ceasefire on its terms. This would have delivered a decisive blow to the standing of Pakistan’s military and political leadership.

Now that Pakistan’s army has been granted a reprieve, it’s not hard to imagine that it may soon revert to its old “cross-border” playbook. Bharat, unfortunately, seems to have missed the opportunity to fully capitalise on its strategic advantage- an omission that may prove costly in the future.

Policy Recommendations

The post-Galwan scenario and Operation Sindoor have demonstrated Bharat’s technology-driven advancements in military capability. Bharat is steering its armed forces toward a unique model that balances medium-tech enabled warfare with a strong ground-force presence. The recent operations, executed with deep precision and punitive response without mass troop mobilization, are a testament to this evolving capacity.

This emerging military model could serve as a blueprint for preparing for future two-front (plus) multi-domain warfare. To realise this vision, the following areas must be prioritised for development:

1. Enhancing Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities- including surveillance over island territories and undersea domains.
2. Developing integrated air defence, solutions for unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and anti-missile capabilities across all three services.
3. Extensive use of military-grade and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drone systems for surveillance, targeting, and both offensive and defensive missions.
4. Developing Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based military technologies, focused on target identification, battlefield management, decision-support systems, and autonomy.
5. Significantly strengthening cyber and electronic warfare capabilities proactively and robustly.
6. Further refinement of long-range vectors, precision munitions, and loitering ammunition technologies.
7. Building and deploying integrated command and control networks, along with advanced decision-support systems.
8. Developing power systems that can operate effectively in remote and high-altitude battlefield environments.

All of these capabilities should be strategically channelled to enhance the combat readiness of the following forces:

• Special Forces,
• Defensive/Holding Formations,
• Counter-terrorism Units, and
• Offensive Formations.

Air Power Control and Its Future Trajectory

In an era dominated by long-range stand-off weapons and missile-drone threats, control of the air has become more critical than ever. The Air Force Doctrine 2022 underscores its importance. India must now focus on:

• Deployment of advanced air defence systems,
• Use of missile systems for counter-air operations, and
• Strengthening the concept of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).

Media Operations and Public Discourse Management

Beyond military capability, today’s operations are increasingly carried out through the media. While cognitive domain operations are now a key part of modern warfare, heated debates in TV studios can mislead public opinion and potentially influence political-military decision-making. Therefore, it is vital to regulate media operations within democratic norms, ensuring that strategic decisions stay protected from public outrage and unverified information.

 

References

Tripathi, Prateek and Bommakanti, Kartik (2025) Air Defence Mechanisms: A Primer on India and Pakistan, Observer Research Foundation (ORF): Issue No. 809, May 2025.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/chinese-support-to-pakistan-during-op-sindoor/

Patil, Sameer and Rawat, Rahul (2025) Operation Sindoor: Understanding Context and Consequences, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Published on 09 May 2025.

Fearon, James D. (1994), ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes’, The American Political Science Review, 88(3): 577-592.

India Confirms It Lost Fighter Jets in Recent Pakistan Conflict.     https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-31/india-confirms-it-lost-fighter-jets-in-recent-pakistan conflict

Luttwak, Edward N. (2001) Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition, Harvard University Press.

Op. Cit. PM’s address to the Nation (May 12, 2025).

Press Information Bureau. Ministry of Defence. OPERATION SINDOOR: INDIAN ARMED FORCES CARRIED OUT PRECISION STRIKE AT TERRORIST CAMPS. 07 May ,2025, 1:44AM. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID= 2127370&reg=3&lang=1. Accessed June 14, 2025.